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networks of entities (firms, banks, individual owners,
pension funds,...) linked by shareholding relationships;
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networks of entities (firms, banks, individual owners,
pension funds,...) linked by shareholding relationships;
their structure;
notion and measurement of control in such networks.
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We represent shareholding networks by weighted graphs:
nodes correspond to firms
arc (i , j) indicates that firm i is a shareholder of firm j
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We represent shareholding networks by weighted graphs:
nodes correspond to firms
arc (i , j) indicates that firm i is a shareholder of firm j
the value w(i , j) of arc (i , j) indicates the fraction of shares
of firm j held by firm i
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We represent shareholding networks by weighted graphs:
nodes correspond to firms
arc (i , j) indicates that firm i is a shareholder of firm j
the value w(i , j) of arc (i , j) indicates the fraction of shares
of firm j held by firm i
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Outsider vs. insider system
Outsider system:
single layer of shareholders;
dispersed ownership, high liquidity;
transparent, open to takeovers;
weak monitoring of management;
typical of US and British stock markets.
Example:
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Outsider vs. insider system
Insider system:
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Outsider vs. insider system
Insider system:
multiple layers of shareholders, possibly involving cycles
concentrated ownership, low liquidity; controlling blocks
strong monitoring of management
typical of Continental Europe and Asia (Japan, South
Korea, . . . )
Examples:
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Concentration patterns across countries





USA 30% < 5%
Averages over large samples of quoted firms.
1 Percentage of shares held by all disclosing
shareholders (above 3-5%)
2 Percentage of shares held by largest shareholder or block.
Yves Crama Control and Voting Power in Shareholding Networks
Shareholding networks and measurement of control
Simple games, Banzhaf indices and Boolean functions






1 Shareholding networks and measurement of control
Shareholding networks
Measurement of control
2 Simple games, Banzhaf indices and Boolean functions
Simple games
Banzhaf index
3 Application to shareholding networks
From shareholders’ control to Banzhaf indices
Dealing with real networks
4 Cycles and float
Yves Crama Control and Voting Power in Shareholding Networks
Shareholding networks and measurement of control
Simple games, Banzhaf indices and Boolean functions







Yves Crama Control and Voting Power in Shareholding Networks
Shareholding networks and measurement of control
Simple games, Banzhaf indices and Boolean functions







Who controls who in a network? To what extent?
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Who controls who in a network? To what extent?
In a pyramidal structure, how can we identify “groups” of
firms “controlled” by a same shareholder?
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Who controls who in a network? To what extent?
In a pyramidal structure, how can we identify “groups” of
firms “controlled” by a same shareholder?
In a pyramidal structure, who are the “ultimate”
shareholders of a given firm?
Note:
Not necessary to own more than 50% of the shares in
order to control a firm.
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Who controls who in a network? To what extent?
In a pyramidal structure, how can we identify “groups” of
firms “controlled” by a same shareholder?
In a pyramidal structure, who are the “ultimate”
shareholders of a given firm?
Note:
Not necessary to own more than 50% of the shares in
order to control a firm.
It has been argued that 20% to 30% are often sufficient.
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Numerous authors have analyzed these issues by relying on
various models.
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Numerous authors have analyzed these issues by relying on
various models.
Model 1:
Firm i controls firm j at level x if there is a “chain” of
shareholdings, each with value at least x%, from firm i to firm j .
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This model (and related ones) suffer from several
weaknesses.
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This model (and related ones) suffer from several
weaknesses.
In particular: they cannot easily be extended to more
complex networks because they do not account for the
whole distribution of ownership.
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This model (and related ones) suffer from several
weaknesses.
In particular: they cannot easily be extended to more
complex networks because they do not account for the
whole distribution of ownership.
Examples:
Compare the following networks.
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Multiply the shareholdings along each path of indirect
ownership; add up over all paths.
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Multiply the shareholdings along each path of indirect
ownership; add up over all paths.
Example:
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Multiply the shareholdings along each path of indirect
ownership; add up over all paths.
Weaknesses:
From the point of view of control, however, the following
situations should be deemed equivalent:
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Look at the shareholders of firm j as playing a weighted
majority game whenever a decision is to be made by firm j .
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Look at the shareholders of firm j as playing a weighted
majority game whenever a decision is to be made by firm j .
Identify the level of control of player i over j with the
Banzhaf power index of i in this game.
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A simple game is a monotonically increasing function
v : 2N → {0, 1}, where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of
players and 2N is the collection of subsets of N.
Interpretation: v describes the voting rule which is adopted
by the players when a decision is to be made.
If S is a subset of players, then v(S) is the outcome of the
voting process when all players in S say “Yes”.
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Players are members of the Senate, members of the
House of Representatives, and the President of the USA.
In order to be adopted, a bill must receive
(1) at least half of the votes in the House of Representatives
and in the Senate, as well as the President’s vote, or
(2) at least two thirds of the votes in the House of
Representatives and in the Senate.
For each subset S of players, the rules indicate whether
v(S) = 0 or v(S) = 1 (bill is either rejected or adopted), as the
outcome of the voting process when all players in S say “Yes”.
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Link with Boolean functions:
a simple game can be viewed as a monotonically increasing
Boolean function which associates a {0, 1} output with every
N-dimensional vector of {0, 1} inputs (votes).
For instance, v(0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1, etc.
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Each player i carries a voting weight wi
There is a voting threshold t
v(S) = 1 ⇐⇒∑i∈S wi > t
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Each player i carries a voting weight wi
There is a voting threshold t
v(S) = 1 ⇐⇒∑i∈S wi > t
Typically, t = 12
∑





Note that the previous example (USA) does not define a
weighted majority game.
In Boolean jargon, a weighted majority game is called a
threshold function.
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The Banzhaf index Z (k) of player k is the probability that,
for a random voting pattern (uniformly distributed), the
outcome of the game changes from 0 to 1 when player k
changes her vote from 0 to 1.
Or: probability that player k is a swing player.
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Member-states of the European Economic Community in
1958: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and
The Netherlands.
Council of Ministers: weighted majority decision rule.
Voting weights: 4 for France, Germany and Italy, 2 for
Belgium and The Netherlands, and 1 for Luxembourg.
Needed: 12 votes to pass a resolution.
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Member-states of the European Economic Community in
1958: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and
The Netherlands.
Council of Ministers: weighted majority decision rule.
Voting weights: 4 for France, Germany and Italy, 2 for
Belgium and The Netherlands, and 1 for Luxembourg.
Needed: 12 votes to pass a resolution.
Observe that Luxembourg had no voting power at all.
The issue of each vote was always determined regardless of
the vote by Luxembourg.
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The Banzhaf index provides a measure of the influence or
power of player k in a voting game. (J. Banzhaf, Rutgers
Law Review 1965.)
The index is related to, but different from the
Shapley-Shubik index.
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The Banzhaf index Z (k) of player k is the probability that,
for a random voting pattern (uniformly distributed), the
outcome of the game changes from 0 to 1 when player k
changes her vote from 0 to 1.







v(T )− v(T \ {k})
)
Note: v(T )− v(T \ {k}) = 1 iff v(T ) = 1 and v(T \ {k}) = 0
(that is: T wins, but T \ {k} loses).
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Link with Boolean functions:
While attempting to characterize Boolean threshold functions,
Chow (1961) has introduced (n + 1) parameters associated
with a Boolean function f (x1, x2, . . . , xn):
(ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn, ω)
where
ω is the number of “ones” of f
ωk is the number of “ones” of f where xk = 1.
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ωk is the number of “ones” of f where xk = 1
=⇒ ωk/2n−1 = probability that f = 1 when xk = 1.
Can be interpreted as a measure of the importance or the
influence of variable k over f .
Can be shown that Banzhaf indices are simple transformations
of the Chow parameters:
Z (k) = (2ωk − ω)/2n−1.
Similar indices in reliability theory.
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Dealing with real networks
Shareholders’ voting game
Look at the shareholders of firm j as playing a weighted
majority game (with quota 50%) whenever a decision is to
be made by firm j
In this model, the level of control of firm i over firm j can be
measured by the Banzhaf index Z (i , j) in the game
Note: Z (i , j) is equal to 1 if firm i owns more than 50% of
the shares of j
Note: More generally, Z (i , j) is not proportional to the
shareholdings w(i , j).
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Single layer of shareholders
Power indices have been proposed for the measurement of
corporate control by several researchers (Shapley and
Shubik, Cubbin and Leech, Gambarelli, Zwiebel,. . . )
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Single layer of shareholders
Power indices have been proposed for the measurement of
corporate control by several researchers (Shapley and
Shubik, Cubbin and Leech, Gambarelli, Zwiebel,. . . )
Most applications have been restricted to single layers of
shareholders (weighted majority games, outsider system)
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Most applications have been restricted to single layers of
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In this case, computing Banzhaf indices is already
NP-hard, but...
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Single layer of shareholders
Power indices have been proposed for the measurement of
corporate control by several researchers (Shapley and
Shubik, Cubbin and Leech, Gambarelli, Zwiebel,. . . )
Most applications have been restricted to single layers of
shareholders (weighted majority games, outsider system)
In this case, computing Banzhaf indices is already
NP-hard, but...
Banzhaf indices can be “efficiently” computed by dynamic
programming (pseudo-polynomial algo)
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But real networks are more complex. . .
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Dealing with real networks
Additional complications
But real networks are more complex. . .
Up to several thousand firms
Incomplete shareholding data (small holders are
unidentified)
Multilayered (pyramidal) structures
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Ultimate relevant shareholders are not univoquely defined
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Multilayered networks
We extend previous studies in several ways:
look at multilayered networks as defining compound
games, i.e., compositions of weighted majority games.
Yves Crama
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Dealing with real networks
Preprocessing
preprocess large networks by identifying all firms which
can influence a given target (for all targets, in succession),
determining the tree structure and the strongly connected
components of the network rooted at the target, and
eliminating firms which are fully controlled.
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v(T )− v(T \ {k})
)
is the expected value of
(
v(T )− v(T \ {k})
)
when T is
drawn uniformly at random.
Handle large networks by simulating votes to estimate this
expected value.
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Float
The float is the set of small, unidentified shareholders.
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Float
The float is the set of small, unidentified shareholders.
We are not interested in computing their power, but still,
they influence the power of larger shareholders.
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Float
The float is the set of small, unidentified shareholders.
We are not interested in computing their power, but still,
they influence the power of larger shareholders.
Modeling: if a large number of small players hold together
a fraction f of the votes, and each of them holds w votes,
then their global vote is approximated by a normally
distributed random variable with mean f/2 and variance
fw/4. This can be used in the simulation model.
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Summary
From shareholders’ control to Banzhaf indices
Dealing with real networks
Float
The float is the set of small, unidentified shareholders.
We are not interested in computing their power, but still,
they influence the power of larger shareholders.
Modeling: if a large number of small players hold together
a fraction f of the votes, and each of them holds w votes,
then their global vote is approximated by a normally
distributed random variable with mean f/2 and variance
fw/4. This can be used in the simulation model.
Question: can we account for the float in a more efficient
way?
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Summary
From shareholders’ control to Banzhaf indices
Dealing with real networks
Cycles
Handle cycles by generating iterated sequences of votes
(looking for “fixed point” patterns, or sampling from the
resulting distribution)
We return later to this issue.
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Summary
From shareholders’ control to Banzhaf indices
Dealing with real networks
Computational experiments
Integrated computer code:
takes as input a database of shareholdings
returns the Banzhaf indices of ultimate shareholders for
every firm
first approach allowing to handle large corporate networks
in a systematic fashion
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Summary
From shareholders’ control to Banzhaf indices
Dealing with real networks
Applications
Stock exchanges: Paris, London, Seoul, Kuala Lumpur
automatic identification of corporate groups (groups of
firms controlled by a same firm)
use of control indices in econometric models of financial
performance
computation of market liquidity indices
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1 Shareholding networks and measurement of control
Shareholding networks
Measurement of control
2 Simple games, Banzhaf indices and Boolean functions
Simple games
Banzhaf index
3 Application to shareholding networks
From shareholders’ control to Banzhaf indices
Dealing with real networks
4 Cycles and float
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Cycles and float
Summary
The problem with cycles. . .
Cycles are a sore point: the compound game is ill-defined
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Application to shareholding networks
Cycles and float
Summary
The problem with the float. . .
The shareholders’ game is not deterministic. Some of the
players are not modeled like Bernoulli players.
Can we extend the definition of the Banzhaf index in this
case?
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Very few attempts at modeling cycles in shareholders’ games
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Very few attempts at modeling cycles in shareholders’ games
Gambarelli and Owen (1994): consistent reduction of
cycles
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Very few attempts at modeling cycles in shareholders’ games
Gambarelli and Owen (1994): consistent reduction of
cycles
“ultimate shareholders” cannot be involved in cycles
the consistent reduction is not unique
the procedure is computationally expensive.
Yves Crama Control and Voting Power in Shareholding Networks
Shareholding networks and measurement of control
Simple games, Banzhaf indices and Boolean functions




Very few attempts at modeling cycles in shareholders’ games
Gambarelli and Owen (1994): consistent reduction of
cycles
“ultimate shareholders” cannot be involved in cycles
the consistent reduction is not unique
the procedure is computationally expensive.
Somewhat different framework:
Hu and Shapley (2003): equilibrium authority distribution
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Very few attempts at modeling cycles in shareholders’ games
Gambarelli and Owen (1994): consistent reduction of
cycles
“ultimate shareholders” cannot be involved in cycles
the consistent reduction is not unique
the procedure is computationally expensive.
Somewhat different framework:
Hu and Shapley (2003): equilibrium authority distribution
assume the propagation of a power index proportionally to
the voting weights
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Very few attempts at modeling cycles in shareholders’ games
Gambarelli and Owen (1994): consistent reduction of
cycles
“ultimate shareholders” cannot be involved in cycles
the consistent reduction is not unique
the procedure is computationally expensive.
Somewhat different framework:
Hu and Shapley (2003): equilibrium authority distribution
assume the propagation of a power index proportionally to
the voting weights
rather ad hoc model?
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Very few attempts at modeling cycles in shareholders’ games
Gambarelli and Owen (1994): consistent reduction of
cycles
“ultimate shareholders” cannot be involved in cycles
the consistent reduction is not unique
the procedure is computationally expensive.
Somewhat different framework:
Hu and Shapley (2003): equilibrium authority distribution
assume the propagation of a power index proportionally to
the voting weights
rather ad hoc model?
No account for the float
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Consider a shareholding network G = (N, A).
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Consider a shareholding network G = (N, A).
for a player j ∈ N and a subset T of its (identified)
shareholders, let vj(T ) denote the outcome of the simple
game played by the shareholders.
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Consider a shareholding network G = (N, A).
for a player j ∈ N and a subset T of its (identified)
shareholders, let vj(T ) denote the outcome of the simple
game played by the shareholders.
vj(T ) may be a (Bernoulli) random variable, e.g.,
(1) when its value depends on the (random) vote of the float,
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Consider a shareholding network G = (N, A).
for a player j ∈ N and a subset T of its (identified)
shareholders, let vj(T ) denote the outcome of the simple
game played by the shareholders.
vj(T ) may be a (Bernoulli) random variable, e.g.,
(1) when its value depends on the (random) vote of the float,
(2) or when the players in T are drawn randomly.
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Consider a shareholding network G = (N, A).
for a player j ∈ N and a subset T of its (identified)
shareholders, let vj(T ) denote the outcome of the simple
game played by the shareholders.
vj(T ) may be a (Bernoulli) random variable, e.g.,
(1) when its value depends on the (random) vote of the float,
(2) or when the players in T are drawn randomly.
Note: under assumption (2), the Banzhaf index of shareholder
k in the game vj is
Zv (k) = Prob
(
vj(T ∪ k)− vj(T ) = 1
)
where T is a random uniform subset of the shareholders of j .
Yves Crama Control and Voting Power in Shareholding Networks
Shareholding networks and measurement of control
Simple games, Banzhaf indices and Boolean functions





Zv (k) = Prob
(
vj(T ∪ k)− vj(T ) = 1
)
can be used more generally when we view vj(X ) as a random
game; e.g., when the float votes randomly.
Note that equivalently, the Banzhaf index of shareholder k in
the game vj is
Zv (k) = Prob
(




E(vj(X ∨ ek ))− E(vj(X )),
where X is a random uniform vector on {0, 1}N .
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vj(T ∪ k)− vj(T ) = 1
)
can be used more generally when we view vj(X ) as a random
game; e.g., when the float votes randomly.
Note that equivalently, the Banzhaf index of shareholder k in
the game vj is
Zv (k) = Prob
(




E(vj(X ∨ ek ))− E(vj(X )),
where X is a random uniform vector on {0, 1}N .
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We would like to interpret again the definition
Zv (k) = Prob
(
vj(X ∨ ek )− vj(X ) = 1
)
,
in the presence of cycles.
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Behavior of firms under the influence of their shareholders:
Crama and Leruth (2007) propose the following model.
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Behavior of firms under the influence of their shareholders:
Crama and Leruth (2007) propose the following model.
Updating rule
Given a vector of votes X ∈ {0, 1}N , each firm j updates its vote
according to the rule X → Y with yj = vj(X ) (simultaneously).
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Behavior of firms under the influence of their shareholders:
Crama and Leruth (2007) propose the following model.
Updating rule
Given a vector of votes X ∈ {0, 1}N , each firm j updates its vote
according to the rule X → Y with yj = vj(X ) (simultaneously).
When vj is random (e.g., because the float votes randomly),
this model defines a Markov chain with state space {0, 1}N and
with transition matrix P(X , Y ), where
P(X , Y ) =
N∏
j=1
Prob(vj(X ) = yj).
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If the network is acyclic and there is no float, then:
the Markov chain converges to a unique distribution of
votes u(X ) for each initial distribution of votes X (as in the
straightforward simple game model).
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the Markov chain converges to a unique distribution of
votes u(X ) for each initial distribution of votes X (as in the
straightforward simple game model).
For each firm j , uj(X ) can be viewed as a simple game.
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If the network is acyclic and there is no float, then:
the Markov chain converges to a unique distribution of
votes u(X ) for each initial distribution of votes X (as in the
straightforward simple game model).
For each firm j , uj(X ) can be viewed as a simple game.
As before, the Banzhaf index of player k in uj is
Prob
(




E(uj(X ∨ ek ))− E(uj(X )),
where X is a random uniform vector on {0, 1}N .
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What can be said in the general (cyclic, stochastic) case?
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What can be said in the general (cyclic, stochastic) case?
For X , Y ∈ {0, 1}N , let p(Y , X , m) be the probability that the
Markov chain, starting from the initial state X , reaches the state
Y after m steps.
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What can be said in the general (cyclic, stochastic) case?
For X , Y ∈ {0, 1}N , let p(Y , X , m) be the probability that the
Markov chain, starting from the initial state X , reaches the state
Y after m steps.
When the limits exist, let q(Y , X ) = limm→∞ p(Y , X , m).
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What can be said in the general (cyclic, stochastic) case?
For X , Y ∈ {0, 1}N , let p(Y , X , m) be the probability that the
Markov chain, starting from the initial state X , reaches the state
Y after m steps.
When the limits exist, let q(Y , X ) = limm→∞ p(Y , X , m).
These define a probabilistic simple game uj for each player j :
for a vector X ∈ {0, 1}N (initial votes of all firms),
Prob(uj(X ) = 1) =
∑
{q(Y , X ) | yj = 1}
(long-term probability that node j take value 1).
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Define again the Banzhaf index of player k in the game uj as
Prob
(
uj(X ∨ ek )− uj(X ) = 1
)
,
where X is a random uniform vector on {0, 1}N .
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The above definition extends the definition of the Banzhaf index
in the case of cyclic networks with float.
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The above definition extends the definition of the Banzhaf index
in the case of cyclic networks with float.
Proposition
In an acyclic shareholding network G (with or without float), the
long-run probabilities exist and the Banzhaf index is well
defined.
Yves Crama Control and Voting Power in Shareholding Networks
Shareholding networks and measurement of control
Simple games, Banzhaf indices and Boolean functions




The above definition extends the definition of the Banzhaf index
in the case of cyclic networks with float.
Proposition
In an acyclic shareholding network G (with or without float), the
long-run probabilities exist and the Banzhaf index is well
defined.
Note:
Acyclicity of G is a sufficient condition, but it is not necessary
for the index to be well defined.
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Cycles and float
Summary
More details and sufficient conditions
{0, 1}N can be partitioned into T ∪ C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cs, where
C1, . . . , Cs are the irreducible classes of the Markov chain.
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Cycles and float
Summary
More details and sufficient conditions
{0, 1}N can be partitioned into T ∪ C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cs, where
C1, . . . , Cs are the irreducible classes of the Markov chain.
For S ⊆ {0, 1}N , let p(S, X , m) be the probability that the
Markov chain reaches a state in S after m steps, starting
from the initial state X .
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Cycles and float
Summary
More details and sufficient conditions
{0, 1}N can be partitioned into T ∪ C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cs, where
C1, . . . , Cs are the irreducible classes of the Markov chain.
For S ⊆ {0, 1}N , let p(S, X , m) be the probability that the
Markov chain reaches a state in S after m steps, starting
from the initial state X .
Proposition
limm→∞ p(Ci , X , m) exists for each irreducible class Ci and for
each initial state X .
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Note: limm→∞ p(Y , X , m) does not necessarily exist for each X
and Y .
Yves Crama Control and Voting Power in Shareholding Networks
Shareholding networks and measurement of control
Simple games, Banzhaf indices and Boolean functions




Note: limm→∞ p(Y , X , m) does not necessarily exist for each X
and Y .
Proposition
If each irreducible class Ci is aperiodic, then
limm→∞ p(Y , X , m) exists for each pair of states X and Y .
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Note: limm→∞ p(Y , X , m) does not necessarily exist for each X
and Y .
Proposition
If each irreducible class Ci is aperiodic, then
limm→∞ p(Y , X , m) exists for each pair of states X and Y .
Proposition
If the shareholders’ network G is acyclic, then the irreducible
classes Ci are aperiodic.
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Note: limm→∞ p(Y , X , m) does not necessarily exist for each X
and Y .
Proposition
If each irreducible class Ci is aperiodic, then
limm→∞ p(Y , X , m) exists for each pair of states X and Y .
Proposition
If the shareholders’ network G is acyclic, then the irreducible
classes Ci are aperiodic.
Acyclicity of G is a sufficient condition, but it is not necessary.
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Game-theoretic power indices provide an appropriate tool
for modelling control in corporate networks.
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Game-theoretic power indices provide an appropriate tool
for modelling control in corporate networks.
Such indices can be efficiently computed, even for
real-world large-size networks.
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Game-theoretic power indices provide an appropriate tool
for modelling control in corporate networks.
Such indices can be efficiently computed, even for
real-world large-size networks.
Interesting theoretical questions emerge in connection with
cyclic and stochastic voting networks.
Interesting links with Boolean functions.
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This work is in progress.
Open questions:
Links among various models: this one, Hu-Shapley,
Gambarelli-Owen, recent work by Grabisch, Rusinowska,
De Swart et al., Van den Brink and Steffen, etc.
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Links among various models: this one, Hu-Shapley,
Gambarelli-Owen, recent work by Grabisch, Rusinowska,
De Swart et al., Van den Brink and Steffen, etc.
Which shareholding networks give rise to aperiodic Markov
chains?
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This work is in progress.
Open questions:
Links among various models: this one, Hu-Shapley,
Gambarelli-Owen, recent work by Grabisch, Rusinowska,
De Swart et al., Van den Brink and Steffen, etc.
Which shareholding networks give rise to aperiodic Markov
chains?
Extensions to other power indices.
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